Economic sanctions are widely used by states to pressure authoritarian governments that violate international norms. Policymakers often expect sanctions to weaken regimes economically and politically and eventually encourage reform or democratization. However, many authoritarian systems survive sanctions for long periods. This raises an important question: under what conditions can sanctions contribute to the weakening of authoritarian rule?
This thesis examines the relationship between economic sanctions and authoritarian regime stability. It draws on the literature on authoritarian durability, particularly Johannes Gerschewski's framework of repression, co optation, and legitimation. According to this framework, authoritarian regimes maintain power through coercion, the distribution of benefits to elites, and the cultivation of social acceptance. Sanctions may disrupt these pillars by reducing state resources, weakening patronage networks, and damaging performance based legitimacy. At the same time, regimes can adapt by increasing repression, tightening elite coalitions, or mobilizing nationalist narratives against foreign pressure.
The study uses apartheid South Africa as a historical case study to analyze how sanctions interact with these mechanisms. During the early Cold War period, Western governments maintained economic and political ties with South Africa because of strategic and economic interests. Over time, international attitudes shifted as apartheid repression became increasingly visible and domestic resistance expanded. By the 1980s, financial restrictions, trade sanctions, corporate withdrawal, and diplomatic isolation placed growing pressure on the apartheid state.
The analysis argues that sanctions became influential only after the erosion of external political and economic support for the regime. As international backing declined, sanctions increased economic uncertainty, weakened elite confidence, and reinforced existing domestic pressures for change. The South African case therefore shows that sanctions are most effective when they coincide with the withdrawal of external support and strong internal resistance. These findings help clarify why sanctions produce different outcomes across countries and offer insight into how contemporary sanctioned regimes may respond to similar forms of international pressure.