The modern presidency has expanded its constitutional authority through the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in three principal domains: executive privilege, removal power, and national security. While scholarship on the conservative legal movement emphasizes its intellectual architecture and judicial influence, far less attention has been paid to the executive branch's internal legal institutions. This study argues that the OLC has served as a critical mechanism through which the Unitary Executive Theory (UET) has been operationalized, transforming contested claims into durable practices in governing. Through analysis of OLC memoranda, judicial context, and doctrinal analysis, this project demonstrates that the institutionalization of executive privilege has strengthened presidential control over information, expansive constructions of removal authority have consolidated hierarchical supervision of administration, and national security opinions have repeatedly framed unilateral presidential action as constitutionally inherent. These developments illustrate a significant, largely overlooked pathway of constitutional change: the capacity of internal executive branch legal interpretation to reshape the distribution of national authority without judicial or legislative intervention. The study concludes by assessing the institutional and democratic implications of this trajectory. While the resulting executive structure does not itself constitute authoritarian governance, it creates a legal and bureaucratic architecture that presidents inclined toward authoritarian practices can easily exploit.
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Eleanor Peterson
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Bradley Hays
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Bradley Hays