Contracts, Competition, and Care: Do Non-Compete Bans Improve Healthcare Access and Continuity?

Non-compete clauses (NCCs) are commonly used in the healthcare industry, restricting physicians from practicing within certain geographic regions after leaving an employer. These clauses can limit physician mobility, reduce competition, and contribute to healthcare market consolidation. This topic has gained more attention in light of the recent legal challenge to the Federal Trade Commission's attempt to ban non-compete agreements nationwide. While previous studies have examined the impact of NCCs on the physician labor markets, fewer studies have explored their direct effects on patient access to care. This study investigates whether state-level bans on non-compete agreements improve individuals' continuity of care and ability to afford medical care. Using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, this study will employ a difference-in-differences econometric model to examine the impact of NCC bans on reported healthcare access. The analysis accounts for socioeconomic factors, such as income, employment, education, and insurance status, as well as individual health conditions and geographic factors. By controlling for these variables, we aim to isolate the effect of NCC bans. We expect to find that NCC bans decrease the number of individuals who report being unable to afford medical care and increase the number of individuals with personal health providers and routine check-ups. This would suggest that removing NCCs increases competition among healthcare providers, which in turn reduces costs and improves access. If confirmed, these results would have significant policy implications, reinforcing arguments for further restrictions on NCCs in the healthcare sector.