Moral judgments often depend on who commits a transgression. Prior research on moral flexibility suggests that people are more tolerant of in-group transgressions in political contexts, primarily because of out-group antipathy rather than ingroup favoritism (Hull et al., 2024). However, much of this research relies on hypothetical scenarios that ask participants to imagine generic transgressors rather than real-life figures. The present study examines whether affinity for actual people better explains variation in moral tolerance. Using a 2 x 2 between-subjects design, participants evaluated
moral transgressions committed by one of four targets: a politician they like, a politician they dislike, a friend, or a foe. Religiosity, political orientation, and narcissism were also examined as potential moderators, with no significant effects found. Unlike Hull et al. (2024), who measured within-subject differences in moral tolerance between political and nonpolitical contexts, the present study conceptualizes moral flexibility as conditional shifts in moral judgments and examines it using a
between-subjects design. Results indicate that affinity positively predicts moral flexibility, with participants demonstrating greater moral flexibility toward well-liked political and personal figures.
Political orientation moderated judgments of political transgressors, with liberals less forgiving toward political transgressors than conservatives. These results offer an alternative explanation for shifts in moral judgment, demonstrating that affinity better accounts for moral evaluation
than political context. The findings elucidate how relational biases shape moral evaluations across political and personal domains.