The formulation and subsequent implementation of China's 2015 military modernization campaign has shifted the relative balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. Namely, developments in applied technological research, increased information-sharing and collaboration between public and private enterprises, and state-funded and -directed investment vehicles have allowed the People's Republic of China to make tremendous advancements in modern conventional and non-conventional capabilities. Central to its military modernization is Beijing's Military-Civil Fusion Strategy (MCFS). But government-led efforts to acquire and repurpose the fruits of competitive, innovative, and private firms are not unique to China. In the United States, Civil-Military Integration (CMI) serves as an inspiration, if not a foundation, for the PRC's contemporary MCFS. Israeli and Japanese initiatives have been modeled after as well. While many writers on the topic have focused on MCF processes in China, offered recommendations for the US Government to take so as to not contribute to the ongoing state-led program, and detailed case studies of MCF in action, little attention has been placed on understanding how MCFS and CMI in the PRC and US, respectively, are similar and different. Although critical to understand how MCF takes shape in China and what effective policy responses may be at USG's disposal, understanding the nuance in both countries can offer us unique insight into understanding the strengths and weaknesses of each system, such as strategic and nascent supply chain and bottleneck vulnerabilities, innovation-driving public-private partnerships, which can offer further detailed options for protecting American national security and integrity of American technology. This study also seeks to identify the more productive and effective elements of each framework in a comparative perspective between the US and PRC. This, in turn, can provide lawmakers with additional options to consider for policy implementation or amendment within the United States, as well as more accurately understanding how the Chinese regulatory environment, party-state apparatus, and quasi-private non-defense industrial and technology base undergird MCF and advance Beijing's national interests.