A common goal in epistemology is to make a theory that explains why some beliefs (or doxastic states in general) are justified while others are not. One attempt at this sort of theory is Process Reliabilism, which holds that a belief is justified if and only if it is the outcome of a reliable process, where a belief-forming process is reliable if and only if it tends to produce true beliefs and tends not to produce false beliefs. There are two popular objections to process reliabilism: the Generality Problem and the No Defeaters Problem. In order to circumvent these two popular objections, I formulate the theory Modified Reliabilism, which is a kind of reliabilism that only describes belief-forming processes that are unique and non-repeatable. I then propose a series of problems for Modified Reliabilism. While Modified Reliabilism is untenable as I formulate it, a successful defense of Modified Reliabilism against the problems I propose promises a more appealing theory with fewer commitments than a successful defense of Process Reliabilism against the Generality Problem and No Defeaters Problem. Moreover, attempting to defend Modified Reliabilism is a new way of defending reliabilism without engaging with the popular and problematic objections against Process Reliabilism.