Doxa as a Type of Imitation in Plato's Epistemology

Doxa (commonly translated as belief) serves an important epistemic role in numerous Platonic dialogues, but Plato never gives a concise and universal account of doxa. In the Republic, the objects of doxa are contrasted with episteme (knowledge) and are treated as ontologically separate, whereas in the Meno and Theaetetus, episteme is described as true doxa with an account (logos). In this paper, I argue that Plato has a consistent account of doxa throughout the dialogues, where doxa is a form of mimesis (imitation) because the objects of doxa are imitations of the Forms themselves. To substantiate this claim, I draw from several dialogues, including Republic, Meno, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus. Thus, doxa and episteme remain ontologically separate. They are different states which individuals can be in. However, the content of both remains related. The imitation of the Form itself does stay true to the Form, but only an aspect of the Form. An imitation of the Form of the Good is therefore only about an aspect of what is good.. While this provides the individual with doxa about the object, it doesn't lead to full understanding of the Form, and knowledge