Two of Plato's conceptual models' put forth in the Theaetetus-the Wax Block theory and the Aviary-contribute significant insights as to how an obfuscated perceptual experience (e.g. seeing someone at a distance) can mislead you into forming a false belief. Plato, nevertheless, dismissed these models on the grounds that they fail to explain how you can form false beliefs where perception is not involved. How is it possible, Plato inquires, to wrongly believe that the sum of 5 and 7 equals 11 given that you have knowledge of both 5 and 7? [196a]. In other words, how can two 'pieces of knowledge' (i.e. the knowledge of 5 and 7) themselves produce a false belief? Despite these concerns, however, I argue that on Plato's own account of knowledge it is possible to form false beliefs even in cases where no perceptual experience is involved. Namely, three ways in which false beliefs can arise independently of any perceptual experience are by: 1) erroneously believing that something you see (or hear) is something else you know, 2) erroneously believing that something you know is another thing that you know, and 3) erroneously believing that something you thought is something else that you know. It is, in all three cases, your haste or eagerness to align a perception, thought, or piece of knowledge with something else that you know that is ultimately responsible for the false belief.