This thesis argues that Augustine's philosophy of time in his work Confessions should be considered a form of presentism and demonstrates how this ancient conception of time is still relevant to modern philosophical debate on the metaphysics of time. Recognizing a shortcoming in the use of the original Latin text in understanding Augustine's argument on time, I focus on his use of language, particularly word choice and verb tense. I examine how his account of creation, his definition of three times, and his explanation of measuring time are all committed to presentism rather than eternalism. Augustine recognizes that God is eternal, but identifies creation as the moment when the present began for humans, who only experience the present, and thus his understanding of creation supports a presentist view. Augustine's definition of the three times (past, present, and future) is also crucial to his account of presentism, as he incorporates all three within the present. Augustine argues that time is an abstract idea that cannot be measured by something physical, but is measured in the mind, which is able to stretch between the past, present, and future. The mind can then form a complete understanding of time and acknowledge that only the present exists. Since Augustine was a theologian and philosopher, I will lastly explain how presentism works with Christian theology and does not clash with the idea of an eternal God. Augustine's argument provides a long-term perspective on modern debates in the metaphysics of time that offers a different outlook and allows us to reevaluate the problem of eternalism versus presentism in today's intellectual discourse on time. By studying time, one gains a better understanding of the world.
Acknowledgements: Angela Comitto from the classics department and David Friedell from the philosophy department